Bakke\u27s Fate by Amar, Akhil Reed & Katyal, Neal Kumar
BAKKE'S FATE
Akhil Reed Amar* and Neal Kumar Katyal**
INTRODUCTION .............................................. 1745
I. PRECEDENT .............................................. 1746
A. Adarand (At First) . ...................................... 1746
B. Bakke ............................................... 1750
C . W ygant .............................................. 1754
D . Croson .............................................. 1756
E. M etro Broadcasting ...................................... 1759
F. Adarand (Again) ....................................... 1767
II. POLICY AND STRUCTURE .................................... 1771
A. Quotas Versus Pluses .................................... 1772
B. Democratic Diversity in Education .......................... 1773
CONCLUSION 9................................................1779
INTRODUCTION
Bakke,' it seems, now hangs by a thread. Will the thread hold?
Should it? To answer these questions, we must reconsider various possible
meanings of the concept of "affirmative action," a phrase that today con-
jures up images of everything from set-asides for government contractors to
diversity programs for college students. In this Article, we propose that
these two particular domains be analyzed separately.2 In the former, affir-
mative action guarantees minority firms "a piece of the action" in getting
government business. In the latter, affirmative action brings young adults
from diverse backgrounds together into a democratic dialogue where they
will learn from each other.
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
** Law Clerk, Hon. Guido Calabresi, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This
Article derives from a UCLA symposium on affirmative action, held on March 2, 1996. For helpful
comments, we thank Vikram Amar, Ian Ayres, Jack Balkin, Alan Brownstein, Jim Chen, Owen
Fiss, James Forman, Paul Gewirtz, Joe Goldstein, Leslie Hakala, Erez Kalir, Ken Karst, Jeff Rosen,
Kathy Ruemmler, Larry Tribe, Rebecca Tushnet, and Eugene Volokh.
1. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. Cf. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) (identifying different domains of life
governed by different ordering principles).
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In a trio of recent cases-City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,3 Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,4 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena'-the
Supreme Court has said a lot about contracting and rather little about
education. Energized by these decisions, some opponents of contracting
set-asides have now set their sights on educational diversity programs. But
one can agree with the reasoning and results of the anti-affirmative action
contracting opinions and still share the vision of Bakke: Because our public
universities should be places where persons from different walks of life and
diverse backgrounds come together to talk with, to learn from, and to teach
each other, each person's unique background and life experience may be
relevant in the admissions process-thus, absolute color-blindness is not
constitutionally required in the education context. In the course of elabo-
rating Bakke's vision, and pondering Bakke's fate, we shall journey first
through Supreme Court precedents and then through various policy-based
and structural arguments about the importance of democratic dialogue and
diversity in public universities.
I. PRECEDENT
A. Adarand (At First)
Our examination begins with the Court's most recent affirmative
action case, Adarand,7 where a white contractor challenged a federal pro-
gram that set aside contracts for minority-owned construction companies.
The contractor argued that his bid to install a guardrail on a federal high-
way was lower than the bid of the contract-winning, minority-owned com-
pany, and that the set-aside thus violated his constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws. The Court, by a five-to-four vote, called for strict
scrutiny and hinted that the program was unconstitutional.' With Justice
O'Connor writing for the majority, the Court overruled its 1990 decision in
3. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
4. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
5. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
6. Because arguments based on the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment seem
largely indeterminate, we do not consider them here at length. See infra text accompanying note
129.
7. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
8. Contrary to many reports, the Court did not rule that the program was unconstitutional;
rather, it remanded the case to a lower court to decide that issue.
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Metro Broadcasting, which had held that federal set-asides should receive
only intermediate scrutiny from the judiciary.9
Yet Adarand said next to nothing about Bakke. In that famous 1978
case, Allan Bakke, a white candidate who had been rejected twice by U.C.
Davis Medical School, filed suit contending that the school's special admis-
sions program for minorities was a rigid quota that excluded him on the
basis of his race. A fractured Court struck down the Davis program but
held that Davis could still use race as a factor in its admissions decisions.' 0
The future of Bakke has obvious importance to state colleges and universi-
ties across America: All these schools are directly governed by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment." And the Court's
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment may have a staggering impact
on private colleges and universities as well. 2
Thus, after Adarand, a huge question remains: What happens to Bakke?
Put another way, though Adarand said virtually nothing about education,
did the Court somehow overrule Bakke sub silentio?
There are different ways to read Adarand. Read one way, the Court
was insisting on "race neutrality" across the board. On this view, the
Court was saying that the government could never take race into account,
except in narrowly defined remedial contexts. At first glance, this reading
might seem compelling. The Court laid down a harsh test: "[AIlI racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."' 3 But
other language reveals the Court's unwillingness to demand complete race
neutrality. As the Court later said, "strict scrutiny does take 'relevant
differences' into account" 4-an open rejection of race-neutrality absolut-
ism. Further, Adarand explicitly rejected the notion that strict scrutiny is
9. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
10. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
11. Some states are considering the abolition of all racial preferences. The University of
California's Regents have already passed such a ban, though it has not yet been implemented.
See B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Board Delays Ban on Affirmative Action, but Discord Persists, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1996, at A24 (noting delay in Regents' implementation of policy that the Uni-
versity "shall not use race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin as a criterion for ad-
mission to the university").
12. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits schools that receive federal funds from
discriminating on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). Because, post-Bakke, Title VI is
to be interpreted in line with the Equal Protection Clause, see infra note 54, a reversal of Bakke
may doom aUl race-conscious diversity programs in private colleges that accept federal funds.
13. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
14. Id.
"strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' 5 For example, the Court noted that
affirmative action may be justified by the "unhappy persistence of both the
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority
groups in this country."16 In another key passage, the Court pointedly left
open the possibility that in applying strict scrutiny judges could seek to
distinguish between a race-conscious "No Trespassing" sign and a race-
conscious "welcome mat."'17 In fact, only two Justices, Thomas and
Scalia, sounded the theme of absolute color-blindness." (Scalia was aware
that he was rejecting the race-consciousness of the majority opinion; he
concurred "except insofar as it may be inconsistent with the following: In
my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminat-
ing on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination
in the opposite direction.") 9
A different reading of Adarand could stress its context: government
contracts for things like guardrails. The Court was not making wholesale
social policy in the case; rather, it was interpreting the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in one particular, and particularly troubling, setting. On this reading,
the differences between contracts and education suggest that Adarand did
not change Bakke. First, many government contracts are highly susceptible
to fraud, since contracts may be awarded to "minority" firms where minori-
ties are "owners" on the books but not in reality, or are present only as
corporate figureheads. By contrast, the opportunities for sham and fraud in
education are constrained by high school guidance counselors and parents,
as well as by the university, which has four years to verify an individual
applicant's claims about who he 'is and where he comes from.20 In addi-
tion, the millions of dollars that may be at stake in any given contract can
be a juicy inducement for corruption of a more general variety. Moreover,
a wider range of people benefits from preferences in education than from
contracting set-asides, which are notorious for helping the well-off and the
15. Id. at 2117 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2114.
18. Id. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
19. Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
20. Admittedly, both schemes pose thorny issues of proof of minority status: How does one
prove that she is really one-eighth black? Should Aleuts count? But as we shall see, infra note
131, university admissions committees can be much more nuanced in considering a whole person,
and her unique background, than can a contracting set-aside program in which a bureaucrat
requires a contractor to check a racial box on a form.
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well-connected.2 How many minorities own construction companies?
Also, contracts are awarded to people throughout their adult years and have
no logical stopping point short of perpetual proportionality in all sectors of
the economy. University education, however, typically occurs early in life
and then ends. Higher education, by making up for educational inequities
at, early stages in life, can be the ramp up to a level playing field-with no
further affirmative action-for the rest of one's future. What's more, affir-
mative action may partially correct the racial skew of what are, quite liter-
ally, educational grandfather clauses-the admissions preferences some
schools award alumni offspring.22
In the end these differences may not be entirely convincing. After all,
Allan Bakke and other whites may still feel victimized by virtue of their
race. But, before agreeing with them, we should stop to ponder the biggest
difference of all. Contracting set-asides mean that "minority firms" win
some projects and "white firms" do not; this can balkanize the races by
encouraging their segregation. Education, in contrast, unites people from
different walks of life. Instead of insular corporations performing various
discrete contracts in isolation-the "minority firm" adds the guardrail after
the "white firm" lays the asphalt-universities draw diverse people into
spaces where they mingle with and learn from each other. Set-asides can go
to a wholly unintegrated firm and therefore do not always help bring Amer-
icans together.23  Integrated education, on the other hand, does not just
benefit minorities-it advantages all students in a distinctive way, by bring-
ing rich and poor, black and white, urban and rural, together to teach and
learn from each other as democratic equals.
If a far-flung democratic republic as diverse-and at times divided-as
late twentieth-century America is to survive and flourish, it must cultivate
some common spaces where citizens from every corner of society can come
together to learn how others live, how others think, how others feel. If not
in public universities, where? If not in young adulthood, when?
21. See, e.g., Evan Gahr, FCC Preferences: Affirmative Action for the Wealthy, INSIGHT MAG.,
Feb. 22, 1993, at 1 (describing how Vernon Jordan, Quincy Jones, O.J. Simpson, and others may
benefit from FCC preferences).
22. UCLA is apparently one such school. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy,
and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REv. 2059, 2068 (1996).
23. One can argue that contracting set-asides might "integrate" minorities into the middle
and upper classes; but without more this "integration" might occur with minorities and whites
living in "separate but equal" segregated middle-class neighborhoods, worshipping in separate
churches, working in separate jobs, and never coming together in common citizenship. Educa-
tional diversity, done right, is inherently integrating. See infra text accompanying notes 134-148.
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B. Bakke
This vision of university diversity,' we submit, is the heart and soul of
Bakke. In that case, four Justices (Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and
White) said the Davis plan, was constitutional. 4 Four Justices (Burger,
Rehnquist, Stevens, and Stewart) said it violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act." And one Justice (Powell) held that the particular Davis
scheme at issue was unconstitutional, but that other affirmative action
plans based on diversity were not.2 6 One certainty emerged from the splin-
tered Court: Five Justices-the Brennan Four and Justice Powell-signed on
to Part V-C of Justice Powell's opinion, which in its entirety reads as
follows:
In enjoining [Davis] from ever considering the race of any appli-
cant, however, the courts below failed to recognize that the State
has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by. a prop-
erly devised admissions program involving the competitive considera-
tion of race and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the
California court's judgment as enjoins [Davis] from any consideration
of the race of any applicant must be reversed.27
In his Foreword to the Harvard Law Review the year Bakke was
announced, John Hart Ely quoted Part V-C and glowed: "That is the Opin-
ion of the Court in Bakke. I'll take it."2 8 But what, exactly, does it mean
to "take" this package? The Court has at times been unclear, and scholars
have not been entirely forthcoming. Yet, beneath the confusion lies a
powerful theory-an argument put forth by the swing vote, Justice Lewis
Powell.
Justice Powell argued that the benefits of integrated education accrue
to all students, 29 and that some affirmative action to increase diversity was
therefore appropriate. The goal of "a diverse student body," he said,
"clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education.... [I]t is not too much to say that 'the nation's future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to' the ideas and mores of
24. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
25. Id. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
26. Id. at 315-20 (opinion of Powell, J.).
27. Id. at 320.
28. John H. Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5, 10 n.33 (1978).
29. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.).
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students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples." 30 Diversity was not,
however, a magical phrase that a university could incant whenever it found
itself in trouble. After all, Justice Powell sided with Allan Bakke and
struck down the Davis program. The Justice wrote that the program's
"fatal flaw" was "its disregard of individual rights" because "[it tells appli-
cants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally excluded
from a specific percentage of the seats in an entering class"31-in short, it
was a rigid set-aside.
I Justice Powell made three big points in Bakke. First, diversity may
enable an educational affirmative action program to pass constitutional
muster because democratic and dialogic educational benefits accrue to all
students. To the Justice, such racial considerations were appropriate when,
for example, blacks would not otherwise be admitted in sufficient numbers
"to bring to their classmates and to each other the variety of points of view,
backgrounds and experiences of blacks in the United States. '32 Second, a
university could not use a strict quota or a rigid set-aside in an attempt to
enhance diversity. It must look instead to the whole person. These two
points led Justice Powell to attach an appendix to his opinion that detailed
the Harvard College Admissions Program. The Harvard program did not
use quotas, but permitted race to "tip the balance" in some cases because
"diversity adds an essential ingredient to the educational process."
3
'
The Harvard plan also satisfied a third aspect of Justice Powell's
vision-an interest in nonracial diversity. He believed that the Davis plan
was unconstitutional because "[n]o matter how strong their qualifications,
quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for contribu-
tion to educational diversity, [nonminority students] are never afforded the
chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for the special
admissions seats."'34 Earlier in his opinion, Justice Powell had declared
that "[tihe diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a
far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or
ethnic origin is but a single though important element" and that the Davis
program, "focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than
further attainment of genuine diversity."'3  In the Harvard plan, by con-
30. Id. at 311-13 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967)).
31. Id. at 319, 320.
32. Id. at 323 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 322, 323.
34. Id. at 319 (opinion of Powell, J.).
35. Id. at 315.
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trast, "[a] farm boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College
that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually bring
something that a white person cannot offer."36
Justice Powell's three arguments are tightly intermeshed. One reason
that a university must not use a rigid quota is that doing so could lead the
school to admit unqualified minorities who would undermine the school's
educational mission. Racial quotas could also hamper the university's
ability to admit nonracially diverse students. 7 And one reason that nonra-
cial diversity was so important was to ensure that all students would be
exposed to people different from themselves-African Americans who grew
up in the inner-city, white farm boys from Idaho, and every permutation in
between. Justice Powell stressed this point in a key footnote quoting the
President of Princeton University:
[A] great deal of learning occurs informally. It occurs through inter-
actions among students of both sexes; of different races, religions,
and backgrounds; who come from cities and rural areas, from various
states and countries; who have a wide variety of interests, talents,
and perspectives; and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn
from their differences and to stimulate one another to reexamine
even their most deeply held assumptions about themselves and their
world."8
Did the four Justices who went along with Justice Powell's Part V-C in
Bakke also embrace the diversity theory in which that Part was nested?
Their opinion contained the following:
[Tjhe central meaning of today's opinions [is that] Government may
take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any
racial group, but to remedy disadvantages ....
... Since we conclude that the affirmative admissions program at
the Davis Medical School is constitutional, we would reverse the
36. Id. at 316 (quoting id. at 323 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.)).
37. In Powell's words:
The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his potential contribution to
diversity without the factor of race being decisive when compared, for example, with that
of an applicant identified as an Italian-American if the latter is thought to exhibit quali-
ties more likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism. Such qualities could include
exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential,
maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to
communicate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed appropriate.
Id. at 317.
38. Id. at 312-13 n.48 (alteration in original).
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judgment below in all respects. [Mr. Justice Powell] agrees that some
uses of race in university admissions are permissible and, therefore,
he joins with us to make five votes reversing the judgment below
insofar as it prohibits the University from establishing race-conscious
programs in the future.39
They then dropped this footnote: "We also agree with Uustice Powell] that
a plan like the 'Harvard' plan is constitutional under our approach, at least
so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated student body is necessi-




There are two ways to read all this. The first is that this "approach"
permits Harvard-style affirmative action only "so long as" it remedies the
effects of past discrimination. The four Justices articulated a test that
stressed remedies for past discrimination4 and then explained how the
Davis plan met this test.42
But, if anything, the Brennan Four's test was more permissive than
Powell's. The Brennan Four said more than their Harvard footnote. They
spoke the language of diversity as well, arguing that the Davis program
"does not, for example, establish an exclusive preserve for minority students
apart from and exclusive of whites. Rather, its purpose is to overcome the
effects of segregation by bringing the races together."43 This language, com-
bined with the caveat "at least" in their Harvard footnote, supports the
diversity argument; the Brennan Four argued that affirmative action in
education "bring[s] the races together" into "an integrated student body"
and that this feature justified even the rigid Davis program." As the most
recent Foreword to the Harvard Law Review, written by Charles Fried,
suggests, "it may not be wrong to say that the difference between Powell
39. Id. at 324-26 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). This statement was attacked by the Stevens
Four, who argued that "only a majority can speak for the Court or determine what is the 'central
meaning' of any judgment of the Court." Id. at 408 n.I (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
40. Id. at 326 n.1 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 369 (arguing that the "government may adopt race-conscious programs if the
purpose of such programs is to remove the disparate racial impact its actions might otherwise
have and if there is reason to believe that the disparate impact is itself the product of past dis-
crimination, whether its own or that of society at large").
42. Id. at 371-73 (looking to low percentage of "Negro physicians" in 1970 and 19th-
century penal sanctions for educating slaves).
43. Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
44. These four Justices did not think that the plus/quota distinction mattered, stating that,
for "purposes of constitutional adjudication, there is no difference between the two approaches."
Id. at 378.
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and Brennan in Bakke was one of degree .... "4 The Brennan Four's
hesitation about diversity, insofar as it existed, may have stemmed from a
worry that the theory could be used to exclude "overrepresented" but his-
torically victimized minorities (caps on Jews or Asians, for example)-and to
make clear that the Court's standard could be applied differently in con-
texts where diversity served to limit the admission of such minorities.
Also, the "at least" language may have hinted at temporal limits on
diversity-based affirmative action: As university affirmative action achieves
its long-run effect of healing racial separation, division, discrimination, and
inequality in American society, race will gradually become irrelevant and-
like eye color or blood type-will cease to be significant for university
admissions.
Does the diversity vision still dwell in the hearts and minds of the
Justices? No member of the original Bakke Five sits on the Court today,
and of the four dissenters, only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens
remain. The Supreme Court that decides the future of Bakke in the late
1990s will look very different from the one that decided the original case in
the late 1970s. We thus must try to understand what the Justices have said
about affirmative action since 1978, and whether their decisions cast doubt
on the Bakke principle. To do this, we shall parse more recent cases by
looking at the Justices individually, with a heavy emphasis on Justice
O'Connor, who, we believe, may well hold the fate'of Bakke in her
hands."
Our survey of the post-Bakke affirmative action cases will demonstrate
an important distinction between contracts and schools. We want to per-
suade readers that a wall between these two domains exists, and that this
wall-at the base of Bakke-has not collapsed under the weight of the vari-
ous post.Bakke contracting cases.
C. Wygant
We start with Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,47 a 1986 case in
which the Court examined a school board's policy of retaining minority
teachers over nonminority teachers in layoff decisions. Justice Powell,
45. Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 13, 48 (1995).
46. Cf. Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience
of One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 122-23 (1989) (noting that, in 1989, Justice O'Connor held the
fate of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in her hands).
47. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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writing for a plurality, held that the plan violated the Equal Protection
Clause and that the role-model theory used to justify the plan-based on
the notion that minority students needed minority teachers as role
models-"had no logical stopping point."48 Unlike the educational diver-
sity theory, role-modelling could apply in virtually every sector of life and
the economy, and seemed premised on segregationist rather than integra-
tionist ideology: "Carried to its logical extreme, the idea that black students
are better off with black teachers could lead to the very system the Court
rejected in Brown v. Board of Education."49
Thus, Justice Powell's repudiation of the role-model theory in no way
signalled a retreat from Bakke. As Justice O'Connor noted in her separate
concurrence, "[tlhe goal of providing 'role models' discussed by the courts
below should not be confused with the very different goal of promoting
racial diversity among the faculty."'° Both here and elsewhere in her con-
currence, Justice O'Connor may have tipped her hand about Bakke. Earlier
in her opinion, she stated-citing to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke-that
"a state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found suffi-
ciently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher education, to support
the use of racial considerations in furthering that interest."'" She never-
theless sided with the white plaintiffs because the school had not relied in
the courts below on the "very different" and possibly winning rationale of
promoting diversity.5
Justice Stevens also played the diversity card in his dissent. He
argued:
In the context of public education, it is quite obvious that a
school board may reasonably conclude that an integrated faculty will
be able to provide benefits to the student body that could not be
provided by an all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty. For one of the
most important lessons that the American public schools teach is
that the diverse ethnic, cultural, and national backgrounds that have
48. Id. at 275 (plurality opinion). Powell also found it significant that the policy concerned
layoffs. Id. at 283 ("While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of
several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular
individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives." (footnotes omitted)).
49. Id. at 267.
50. Id. at 288 n.* (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
51. Id. at 286 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.)).
52. Id. at 288 n.* ("Because this latter goal was not urged as such in support of the layoff
provision before the District Court and the Court of Appeals, however, I do not believe it neces-
sary to discuss the magnitude of that interest or its applicability in this case.").
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been brought together in our famous "melting pot" do not identify
essential differences among the human beings that inhabit our land.
It is one thing for a white child to be taught by a white teacher that
color, like beauty, is only "skin deep"; it is far more convincing to
experience that truth on a day-to-day basis during the routine, on-
going learning process.
5 3
Note Justice Stevens' emphasis on the facts that diversity brings benefits
"to the [entire] student body," that "white child[ren]" learn from diversity
via "day-to-day" intermingling with others in an "ongoing learning pro-
cess," and that American schools serve a vital function when they bring
Americans of different backgrounds "together" in "integrated" settings.54
D. Croson
Wygant was written the year before Justice Kennedy joined the Court,
and the decision thus sheds no light on his thinking. We begin to under-
stand Justice Kennedy, and the nuanced world of Justice O'Connor, by
examining the 1989 contracting case, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co."5 In Croson, the Justices reviewed the constitutionality of Richmond's
set-aside plan, which reserved thirty percent of the city's contracts for
minority-owned businesses; at issue was a plumbing contract to install uri-
nals and toilets in a city jail. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor
applied strict scrutiny and found that the city set-aside violated the Equal
53. Id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (foomote omitted).
54. By contrast, Justice Stevens's opinions during the 1970s were considerably more hostile
to racial preferences. In Bakke, he argued that the Davis program violated Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. In the wake of Bakke, however, the law is settled: In public schools, Title VI
protects only what the Fourteenth Amendment protects. Therefore, to understand how Justice
Stevens would vote today, we must examine his approach to the Fourteenth Amendment. Soon
after Bakke, he authored a highly influential dissent in Fullilove v. Klutmick, 448 U.S. 448, 532
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting), a dissent that became the basis for the Court's holding in
Adarand. (Justice O'Connor's Adarand opinion repeatedly cited Justice Stevens's Fullilove dissent.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2109, 2113, 2117 (1995).) But in the
post-Fullilove era, Wygant was one of many steps that Justice Stevens took in retreat from his
1970s race-neutrality vision.
Since Bakke, Justice Stevens has been the most forceful advocate on the Court for non-
remedial affirmative action measures. He has consistently argued that affirmative action
makes just as much sense when it promotes an interest in creating a morie inclusive and
diverse society for today and the future, as when it serves an interest in remedying past
wrongs.
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to
General Counsels 18 Uune 28, 1995), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 125, at D-33 (June
29, 1995).
55. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Protection Clause. 6 She suggested that "perhaps the city's purpose was
not, in fact, to remedy past discrimination" 57 _the majority-black
Richmond City Council was favoring blacks and other minority busi-
nesses-and found that the program was not "narrowly tailored to remedy
the effects of prior discrimination."51 While she quoted different parts of
Justice Powell's Bakke opinion,5 9 diversity was never an issue in the case.
Justice Stevens largely concurred, but went out of his way to suggest
that Croson contracts could be distinguished from Bakke benefits:
[S]ome race-based policy decisions may serve a legitimate public
purpose. I agree, of course, that race is so seldom relevant to legisla-
tive decisions on how best to foster the public good that legitimate
justifications for race-based legislation will usually not be available.
But unlike the Court, I would not totally discount the legitimacy of
race-based decisions that may produce tangible and fully justified
future benefits. See n.2, infra; see also Justice Powell's discussion in
University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-19
(1978)6 0
Stevens continued by emphasizing the difference between the contracting
and education contexts, stating that "the city makes no claim that the
public interest in the efficient performance of its construction contracts will
be served" by the preference and that "[tihis case is therefore completely
unlike Wygant, in which I thought it quite obvious that the school board
had reasonably concluded that an integrated faculty could provide educa-
tional benefits to the entire student body that could not be provided by an
all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty."6  (Then-Judge Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, while on the D.C. Circuit, explicitly endorsed Justice Stevens'
Croson concurrence and argued "that remedy for past wrong is not the
exclusive basis upon which racial classifications may be justified.")62
Justice Kennedy also concurred, eloquently sounding the theme of race
neutrality-a theme that Justice Scalia amplified in his own separate Croson
.56. Although the portion of her opinion announcing a strict scrutiny test was technically
only a plurality opinion representing four votes, id. at 493-96, Justice Scalia's concurrence added,
in effect, a fifth vote for (at least) strict scrutiny of state-initiated affirmative action, id. at 520-28
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. Id. at 506.
58. Id. at 508.
59. Id. at 493-94, 497, 506.
60. Id. at 510 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
61. Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
62. O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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concurrence. 63 In Justice Kennedy's soaring words: "The moral impera-
tive of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection
Clause."' In general, we take Justice Kennedy's heartfelt vision here as a
sign of his strong reluctance to accept diversity as a justification for taking
race into account. He has not directly confronted the issue, but his pas-
sionate writings on race suggest that he is uncomfortable with the notion
that government action should ever hinge on a person's race.65 Yet per-
haps he may be persuaded by the many differences between the Harvard
and Richmond plans; and it remains to be seen what will happen when his
race neutrality impulse confronts his strong affinity for precedent and his
willingness to examine thorny race issues on a case-by-case basis. Indeed,
in Croson itself, Justice Kennedy carefully trimmed his sails to take account
of past precedent: "[G]iven that a rule of automatic invalidity for racial
preferences in almost every case would be a significant break with our pre-
cedents that require a case-by-case test, I am not convinced we need adopt
it at this point. ,66
63. Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
64. Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
65. For example, in one of the important voting rights cases decided last year, Miner v.
Johnson, Justice Kennedy began his opinion by quoting Justice Powell's exhortation: "'Racial and
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination."' 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2482 (1995) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)). This principle, Kennedy argued, "obtains with
equal force regardless of the 'race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification."'
Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494). This, once again, is the theme of race neutrality. See also
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (opinion of Kennedy, J., for the Court).
It is suggested that no particular stigma or dishonor results if a prosecutor uses the
raw fact of skin color to determine the objectivity or qualifications of a juror. We do not
believe a victim of the classification would endorse this view; the assumption that no
stigma or dishonor attaches contravenes accepted equal protection principles. Race
cannot be a proxy for determining juror bias or competence.
Id.; cf. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (opinion of Kennedy, J., for the
Court).
[D]iscrimination on the basis of race in selecting a jury in a civil proceeding harms the
excluded juror no less than discrimination in a criminal trial. In either case, race is the
sole reason for denying the excluded venireperson the honor and privilege of partici-
pating in our system of justice.
Id. (citation omitted).
66. Croson, 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
E. Metro Broadcasting
We turn next to Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,67 where the 1990
Court examined the constitutionality of two policies adopted by the Federal
Communications Commission. In one policy, the FCC gave preferences to
minority-owned firms when it reviewed license applications for new radio or
TV stations. In the other, the "distress sale" program, a radio or TV sta-
tion whose license qualifications had come into question could transfer that
license to another entity before the FCC resolved the matter, if and only if
the transferee was a minority enterprise. The policies tried to blur the line
between educational diversity and contracting; the FCC, relying on Bakke,
claimed that the broadcast preferences were designed to ensure diversity in
programming.
In upholding the FCC policies, Justice Brennan's opinion for the
Court made two crucial moves. First, it argued that courts should defer to
Congress because of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and other
considerations. 61 Second, it found that Congress's broadcast policy was
justified because racial preferences enhanced broadcast diversity. In elabo-
rating the second argument, Justice Brennan tried to plant himself squarely
on the shoulders of Justice Powell:
Against this background, we conclude that the interest in enhan-
cing broadcast diversity is, at the very least, an important govern-
mental objective and is therefore a sufficient basis for the
Commission's minority ownership policies. Just as a "diverse student
body" contributing to a "'robust exchange of ideas'" is a "constitu-
tionally permissible goal" on which a race-conscious university
admissions program may be predicated, Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-313 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.), the diversity of views and information on the airwaves
serves important First Amendment values. Cf. Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 314-315 (1986) ([Stevens], J.,
dissenting). The benefits of such diversity are not limited to the
67. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
68. Id. at 563.
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members of minority groups who gain access to the broadcasting
industry by virtue of the ownership policies; rather the benefits
redound to all members of the viewing and listening audience. As
Congress found, "the American public will benefit by having access
to a wider diversity of information sources."'69
Justice Stevens, concurring, found that the "public interest in broad-
cast diversity-like the interest in an integrated police force, diversity in
the composition of a public school faculty or diversity in the student body
of a professional school-is in my view unquestionably legitimate. ' 70 He
then dropped a footnote here: "See Justice Powell's opinion announcing
the judgment in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
311-19 (1978)." 71
But the majority's use of Bakke did not go unchallenged-Justice
O'Connor, flanked by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, dissented.72 Her opinion may be read to mean more, but it is at
least, an attack on the FCC's attempt to stretch Bakke to cover the broad-
casting sphere. Early on, she stated that "the Constitution provides that
the Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among individuals
based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act or
think."71 Such classifications "endorse race-based reasoning and the con-
ception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an esca-
lation of racial hostility and conflict. '74  And she went on to attack the
interest in diversity:
The interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is
clearly not a compelling interest. It is simply too amorphous, too
insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing
racial classifications .... We have recognized that racial classifica-
tions are so harmful that "[ulnless they are strictly reserved for reme-
dial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority
and lead to a politics of racial hostility."
69. Id. at 567-68 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 601-02 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
71. Id. at 602 n.6.
72. Id. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 603 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989)).
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... We determined [in Croson] that a "generalized assertion" of
past discrimination "has no logical stopping point" and would sup-
port unconstrained uses of race classifications. 75
Now these are strong words about diversity. And some may think that
these strong words doom Bakke. But, read closely, we believe that Justice
O'Connor's words can be confined to the contracting sphere and the
"diversity of broadcast viewpoints."
After all, Justice O'Connor both began and ended her dissent by
appealing to precedent. Her first paragraph claimed that Brennan's defer-
ential approach "finds no support in our cases" 76 and her last substantive
sentence excoriated the majority's "break with our precedents."77
Nowhere in her opinion did Justice O'Connor repudiate Bakke-she only
repudiated an extension of Bakke beyond the education context. Indeed, in
the course of explaining why Bakke cut against the FCC, she thrice expli-
citly cited with approval Justice Powell's Bakke opinion.7" What's more,
she never disavowed what she said in Wygant, and we should not lightly
assume that her later Metro Broadcasting dissent took back her earlier state-
ment sub silentio. In fact, she had gone out of her way in Croson to cite
Powell's opinion in Bakke, and some of her most powerful language in
Metro Broadcasting-about "racial hostility" often engendered by non-
remedial affirmative action-came from the exact passage of her earlier
Croson opinion where she cited Powell. 79
Indeed, Justice O'Connor's opinion highlighted five troublesome
features of affirmative action in the contracting case before her, and these
five do not apply straightforwardly to all educational diversity programs.
First, as noted above, she argued that the FCC's theory lacked a logical
stopping point and seemed to push hard toward strict racial proportional
representation in broadcasting and elsewhere.' Second, she pointed out
75. Id. at 612-13 (first alteration in original) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 498).
76. Id. at 603. See also her statement that "modem equal protection doctrine has recog-
nized only" the remedial interest as compelling, id. at 612, a statement that can be read at face
value as merely describing past precedent.
77. Id. at 631.
78. Id. at 619, 621, 625.
79. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 298 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
80. On stopping points in education, see supra text accompanying note 22 and infra text
accompanying notes 142-145.
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that FCC licenses are "exceptionally valuable property" and that "given
the sums at stake, applicants have every incentive to structure their owner-
ship arrangements to prevail in the comparative process "81-perhaps creat-
ing the possibility of sham and corruption. 2 This concern was elaborated
in a separate dissent by Justice Kennedy, who argued that the FCC pro-
grams "often are perceived as targets for exploitation by opportunists who
seek to take advantage of monetary rewards without advancing the stated
policy of minority inclusion."83 Justice Kennedy added a pointed footnote
here, noting that the beneficiary of the FCC policy in the case at hand was
a company with a capitalization of $24 million with only one minority
investor who had contributed a paltry $210.s
Third, Justice O'Connor emphasized that diversity of ownership may
not translate into diversity of programming. Explicitly invoking Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke, she argued that powerful market forces shape
prcgramming so that station owners tend to have only limited control over
the ultimate form and content of their broadcasts."5 (Her observation that
the owner's racial identity often has little to do with the output and con-
tent of the broadcast has been powerfully confirmed by the recent experi-
ence of the Fox Television network-owned by a white, with programming
that has attracted large black audiences.) 6 Fourth, Justice O'Connor
found the FCC licensing scheme problematic because it operated by "iden-
tifying what constitutes a 'Black viewpoint,' an 'Asian viewpoint,' an 'Arab
81. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 630 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
82. By contrast, affirmative action in education operates on individuals, not corporations,
and does not typically involve vast sums of money in any given case. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 20-21.
83. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 636 n.3. Elsewhere in his dissent, which was joined by Justice Scalia but-
interestingly-not by Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy sounded strong themes of race neutral-
ity. See, e.g., id. at 631-32 (comparing majority opinion to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896)). This is itself, perhaps, revealing of a subtle difference of approach on this question
between Justices Kennedy and O'Connor-a difference that may also be manifest in Miller v.
Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). Compare supra note 65 with infra text accompanying note 109.
In another key footnote in his Metro Broadcasting dissent, Justice Kennedy voiced concern
about defining which minorities count and who counts as a minority-what we have called the
"Aleut" and "Octoroon" problems. See 497 U.S. at 633 n.1 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); supra note
20. For an explanation of how the Harvard plan, sensitively administered, helps allay these
concerns, see infra note 131.
85. Id. at 619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("This strong link between race and behavior,
especially when mediated by market forces, is the assumption that Justice Powell rejected ifi his
discussion of health care service in Bakke."). By contrast, an individual student has more control
over the "content" of the views he expresses in classes, cafeterias, dormitories, etc.
86. We thank Jim Chen for this reminder.
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viewpoint,' and so on; determining which viewpoints are underrepresented;
and then using that determination to mandate particular programming. "87
All of this suggests that Justice O'Connor in Metro Broadcasting did
not repudiate Justice O'Connor in Wygant. And to these four reasons can
be added a fifth-the Harvard plan. Justice O'Connor reserved her most
powerful language for an attack on the FCC's "racial classifications." Her
language must be understood in view of what she meant by that phrase. To
us, these words reference her earlier excoriation of the FCC policies as a
"direct[] equat[ion ofi race with belief and behavior, for they establish race
as a necessary and sufficient condition [for] securing the preference."88
The key words here are "equation" and "sufficient"; the Justice was taking
issue with the crude view that race is by itself-without ever looking at the
whole person-enough to presume that one has a certain set of beliefs.
Government may not presume that race determines how a person thinks or
acts; but perhaps this is different from saying that government may not
conclude that race may influence how a person thinks and that government
must be utterly blind to race when looking at an applicant as a whole per-
son.8 9  The kind of wooden "racial classification" at issue in Metro
87. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 615 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This concern closely
connects to a fifth, which we discuss in detail infra text accompanying notes 88-110. By con-
trast, a proper Harvard-style education plan does not assume that there is, say, only one way to be
black. Cf. Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839 (1996). A follower of
Thomas Sowell or Linda Chavez or George Will is no less authentically black than an adherent
of Jesse Jackson. Justice Powell's Bakke Appendix pointedly quoted Harvard's recognition of the
importance of intra- as well as inter-racial diversity:
The Admissions Committee, with only a few places left to fill, might find itself forced to
choose between A, the child of a successful black physician in an academic community
with promise of superior academic performance, and B, a black who grew up in an inner-
city ghetto of semi-literate parents whose academic achievement was lower but who had
demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an apparently abiding interest in black
power. If a good number of black students much like A but few like B had already been
admitted, the Committee might prefer B; and vice versa.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (appendix to the opinion of
Powell, J.).
88. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also
id. at 615 (condemning "generalizations impermissibly equating race with thoughts and behavior"
(emphasis added)); id. at 629 (similarly condemning the "equation of race with behavior and
thoughts" (emphasis added)).
89. See also id. at 618 (attacking notion that "a particular and distinct viewpoint inheres in
certain racial groups" and that "race or ethnicity alone" guarantees diversity (emphasis added)); id.
at 618-19 (noting that FCC assumes a "particularly strong correlation of race and behavior" and
condemning this assumed "strong link between race and behavior"); id. at 619-20 (attacking the
majority's willingness to uphold "equation of race with distinct views" because the "racial general-
ization inevitably does not apply to certain individuals" (emphasis added)).
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Broadcasting, O'Connor felt, "may create considerable tension with the
Nation's widely shared commitment to evaluating individuals upon their
individual merit." 9 Indeed, in the very first sentence of her dissent, Justice
O'Connor pointedly set the stage: "At the heart of the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Govern-
ment must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial,
religious, sexual or national class."'"
On this reading, Justice O'Connor's analysis is quite similar to Justice
Powell's approach in Bakke: When the government looks solely at race and
admits people only because of their skin color, it violates equal protec-
tion.92 Indeed, on one occasion she cites Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke for the following proposition: "IR]ace-conscious measures might be
employed to further diversity only if race were one of many aspects of back-
ground sought and considered relevant to achieving a diverse student
body."93 To be sure, this favorable citation can be construed narrowly-it
is a carefully guarded statement, and even then perhaps only an argument
in the alternative-but it tracks much of Justice O'Connor's own language.
Two pages later, for example, she writes that "if the FCC believes that
certain persons by virtue of their unique experiences will contribute as
owners to more diverse broadcasting, the FCC could simply favor applicants
whose particular background indicates that they will add to the diversity of
programming, rather than rely solely upon suspect classifications."94
Read this way, Justice O'Connor's opinion supports the need for a
different contextual approach to education.95 A college application allows
an admissions office to look at the views and attitudes of a whole person in
a way that the GSA cannot and the FCC did not. After an admissions
office reviews an entire personal application file, with a personal statement,
recommendations, and the like, it is much easier to tell whether a given
90. Id. at 604 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 602 (quoting Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983)) (internal quotation marks deleted).
92. Recall that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke featured passages sharply criticizing various
types of affirmative action-passages that powerfully anticipated much of Justice O'Connor's
language in Metro Broadcasting. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-20 (opinion of Powell, J.).
93. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 621 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 625 (citing
Justice Powell in Bakke for the notion that government may not allocate benefits "simply on the
basis of race" (emphasis added)).
94. Id. at 623 (emphasis added).
95. Her Metro Broadcasting dissent also expressed concern that allegedly "benign" theories
like "role modelling" and broadcasting diversity could "justify limitations on minority members'
participation in" affirmative action programs. Id. at 614-15 (emphasis added). On this concern,
see supra text accompanying notes 45-50 and infra note 144.
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applicant will bring diversity to a university than it is to tell whether a
contractor will somehow "diversify" things. Put another way, Justice
O'Connor in Metro Broadcasting was troubled by "[tihe ill fit of means to
ends" in the FCC program.96 In particular, she felt that the FCC's policy
was "overinclusive" because "[miany members of a particular racial or eth-
nic group will have no interest in advancing the views the FCC believes to
be underrepresented," and that the policy was "underinclusive" because
"[i]t awards no preference to disfavored individuals who may be particularly
well versed in and committed to presenting those views. '97 Both under-
inclusiveness and overinclusiveness were, of course, factors that drove
Justice Powell to strike down the group-oriented Davis plan and to support
the individual-focused Harvard one. In short, we believe that Justice
O'Connor's language attacked a program in which race was widely equa-
ted-categorically-with viewpoint, and sufficient, by itself, to win massive
government largesse." Thus, her language may be inapposite to Harvard-
plan diversity in education.
This distinction can explain why, in Wygant, Justice O'Connor stated
that "a state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found
sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher education, to
support the use of racial considerations in furthering that interest."'" To
Justice O'Connor as well as Justice Powell, the diversity rationale may not
be enough to uphold quotas and rigid set-asides, but it may be enough to
uphold the use of race as a "consideration" or "plus" in admissions.
Justice O'Connor has pursued similar distinctions between classifica-
tions and considerations in other cases. In the 1987 Title VII case, Johnson
v. Transportation Agency,'00 for example, she approved an affirmative
action plan in which gender was used only as a "'plus' factor.' l l  She
noted that if "an affirmative action program ... automatically and blindly
96. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 621 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 621.
98. Justice Brennan tried to portray the FCC policies as akin to the Harvard plan, with race
as a mere "'plus' to be weighed together with all other relevant factors." Id. at 557 (opinion of
the Court); see also id. at 597 & n.50. Justice O'Connor sharply disagreed, noting that one of the
two FCC policies was the worst of all "rigid quota[s]"-"a 100% set-aside." Id. at 630 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). As to the second FCC policy, she found that "[t]he basic nonrace criteria are not
difficult to meet" and that "race is clearly the dispositive factor in a substantial percentage of
comparative proceedings"-perhaps "overwhelmingly the dispostive factor." Id. at 630-31.
99. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 311-15 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)) (emphasis added).
100. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
101. Id. at 656 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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promotes those marginally qualified candidates falling within a preferred
race or gender category," the program would violate Title VII. °2 Because
the facts of Johnson suggested that the applicant who won the promotion
"was not selected solely on the basis of her sex," she voted to uphold the
plan.' °3 The Justice's views cannot be dismissed because Johnson was a
statutory case; her concurrence explicitly stated that "the proper initial
inquiry in evaluating the legality of an affirmative action plan by a public
employer under Title VII is no different from that required by the Equal
Protection Clause."104
Two years later in her plurality opinion in Croson, Justice O'Connor
used precise language in condemning Richmond's "rigid rule" denying
whites "the opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage of public con-
tracts based solely upon their race."105  Similarly, in the 1993 voting
rights case Shaw v. Reno,"° Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority, de-
clared it "antithetical to our system of representative democracy" when "a
district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common inter-
ests of one racial group."' O° Yet she cushioned her race neutrality with
soft language about the permissibility of taking race into consideration,
noting that "the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district
lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political
persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors" and that "[t]hat sort
of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrim-
ination." '°  Again, Justice O'Connor is contending that when race is
one factor among many and is not-by itself-a sufficient factor, then tak-
ing race into account may be constitutional. This was also her message in
the 1995 voting rights case, Miller v. Johnson.'O° In a separate concur-
rence (citing to the page from Shaw with the above language), she stated
that the majority opinion "does not throw into doubt the vast majority" of
the districts because "States have drawn the boundaries in accordance with
their customary districting principles .... [E]ven though race may well have
been considered in the redistricting process."" 0  The fifth factor, the con-
102. Id.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 649.
105. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (emphasis added).
106. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
107. Id. at 2827 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 2826.
109. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
110. Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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sideration/classification distinction, therefore, may be weighty enough to
produce a fifth vote for Bakke today.
Our reading of the cases thus shows how Justice O'Connor has fol-
lowed a consistent (yet nuanced) approach to affirmative action and racial
issues-and not the unprincipled, ad hoc jurisprudence that some of her
critics decry.
F. Adarand (Again)
With this quick trip through the pre-Adarand precedents now com-
plete, let us return to Adarand itself. While we believe that the contracting
cases, in general, do not say very much about education, we note that
Justices Scalia and Thomas have chosen language in Adarand and elsewhere
making clear their passionate belief in race neutrality across the board.
Justice Thomas wrote that the "government may not make distinctions on
the basis of race" and declared it "irrelevant whether a government's racial
classifications are drawn by those who wish to oppress a race or by those
who have a sincere desire to help those thought to be disadvantaged.""1
Justice Scalia offered up a similar vision: "In the eyes of government, we
are just one race here. It is American.... While neither Justice has con-
fronted diversity, neither has shown any sign of supporting Bakke. We
strongly suspect that, despite the many significant differences in the educa-
tion sphere, both Justices will be blinded by the color consciousness of
diversity programs and will vote to overrule Bakke. And we expect that
Chief Justice Rehnquist will follow their lead. While he did not join the
rigid Scalia-Thomas approach in Adarand, his independence may reflect a
111. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment).
112. Id. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This noble
vision would have been more persuasive coming from Justice Scalia had he not contradicted it in
his dissent in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 423-26 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
government prosecutors could lawfully strike black jurors through the use of race-based peremp-
tory challenges). For criticism of Justice Scalia's Powers approach, see id. at 410 (majority opin-
ion, per Kennedy, J.).
The suggestion that racial classifications may survive when visited upon all persons is no
more authoritative today than the case which advanced the theorem, Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896). The idea has no place in our modem equal protection jurispru-
dence. It is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become legitimate on the assump-
tion that all persons suffer them in equal degree. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id.; see also Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King,
95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 50 n.246 (1995).
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worry that their opinions were too broad for the facts in Adarand. William
Rehnquist voted for Allan Bakke once, and his writings and opinions reveal
no faith in Lewis Powell's diversity theory.
In his Adarand dissent, Justice Stevens once again showed his true
colors. He pointed out that the decision said nothing about "fostering
diversity" because the issue was not even "remotely presented" and that he
did "not take the Court's opinion to diminish that aspect of our decision in
Metro Broadcasting.""' 3 Having earlier sided with Justice Stevens on the
issue in the 1992 D.C. Circuit O'Donnell case,114 Justice Ginsburg unsur-
prisingly joined his Adarand dissent, and went on to write a separate dissent
(joined by Justice Breyer) offering a hopeful reading of Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion. ll5  Justice Souter likewise dissented, and his separate
dissent (joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg), while saying nothing about
diversity, rejected the idea of strict race neutrality and extolled the virtues
of precedent. 6
But are the Adarand dissenters right in suggesting that Bakke lives?
Since Adarand overruled Metro Broadcasting in part, and Metro Broadcasting
relied on Bakke, does this mean that the Court has overruled Bakke? No.
The Court, we repeat, nowhere explicitly overruled Bakke, and so, under
well established general principles, it clearly remains binding precedent for
all lower courts, state and federal. 7  Also recall that Adarand overruled
113. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
114. See supra text accompanying note 62.
115. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2134-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 2131-34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
117. As this Article was going to press, a panel of the Fifth Circuit struck down the affirma-
tive action program adopted by the University of Texas Law School. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). The majority opinion held that "the law
school may not use race as a factor in law school admissions" and that "the use of race to achieve
a diverse student body ... simply cannot be a state interest compelling enough to meet the steep
standard of strict scrutiny." Id. at 934, 948. Further language in the opinion suggested, however,
that a school may enact racial preferences to redress "past wrongs at that school." Id. at 952.
Judge Jacques Wiener, Jr., specially concurring, found that the majority's diversity
conclusion may well be a defensible extension of recent Supreme Court precedent ....
Be that as it may, this position remains an extension of the law--one that ... is both
overly broad and unnecessary to the disposition of this case....
... [lf Bakke is to be declared dead, the Supreme Court, not a three-judge panel of
a circuit court, should make that pronouncement.
Id. at 963.
There were reasons, under Bakke, why the Texas program-especially prior to 1994-may
have been unconstitutional, see infra note 142. The Hopwood majority opinion, however, seems
troubling to the extent that it reached out beyond these reasons to defy Part V-C of Bakke (curi-
ously not mentioned anywhere in Hopwood)-a section that, we repeat, was an opinion of the
Court. As Justices Kennedy and O'Connor have written for the Court, one thing that a lower
court cannot do is to anticipate an overruling of an opinion of the Court by disregarding the
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Metro Broadcasting only "[to the extent" that it "[was] inconsistent" with
the holding that "strict scrutiny is the proper standard for analysis of all




While Adarand overruled one of the two crucial steps in Metro Broadcasting,
the deference given to Congress, it did not pass judgment on the other, the
diversity argument.
Perhaps most important, Adarand teaches us a valuable lesson about
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Justice Kennedy has been a proponent of
race neutrality but he has also been a proponent of precedent. So has
Justice O'Connor. Joined at that point only by Justice Kennedy, she care-
fully crafted one section of Adarand in light of her 1992 Casey opinion
(coauthored with Justices Kennedy and Souter), 119 which cautioned
against overruling hugely important cases around which major social expec-
tations have crystallized. 20  Casey thus simultaneously affirmed Roe v.
Wade and overruled more minor post-Roe cases. By the Casey test, Bakke is
like Roe and should stand, even after the more minor Metro Broadcasting is
tossed out. Only Justices O'Connor and Kennedy used this test in Adarand,
presumably because Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
did not want to join anything that could be construed as support for Roe.
Yet Justices O'Connor and Kennedy hold the two most crucial votes, as
dramatized by Casey and Adarand themselves. Thus, a big "plus" for Bakke
is its social importance. An entire generation of Americans has been
schooled under Bakke-style affirmative action, with the explicit blessing
of-indeed, following a how-to-do-it manual from-U.S. Reports.'' Only
opinion. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
(Kennedy, J.) ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower courts] should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."); Ameri-
can Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 180 (1990) (opinion of O'Connor, J., for the
Court) (similar).
Admittedly, Part V-C presents thorny social-choice theory problems if its clear command-
state universities may take race into account-were seen as resting on two inconsistent theories
(the diversity theory and the remedial theory), neither of which, it might be argued, clearly com-
manded a majority of the Bakke Court. But surely these problems cannot be solved simply by
ignoring Part V-C-which is, we repeat, the holding of Bakke. See also supra text accompanying
notes 39-45 (suggesting that the Brennan Four opinion, read carefully, did embrace the diversity
theory).
118. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
119. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
...120. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114-17 (plurality opinion).
121. See Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection
Doctrine, 14 HAPV. C.R.-C.L. 7, 7 (1979); cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 868 ("[N]o Court that broke its
faith with the people could sensibly expect credit for principle in the decision by which it did
that.").
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a handful of modern Supreme Court cases are now household words in
America. But Bakke-like Brown and Roe-is surely one of them. (And if
overruling Bakke were also to mean suddenly that all federally funded pri-
vate schools must never consider race in their admissions, a sharp resegrega-
tion of higher education might occur-the possible social upheaval is rather
startling to contemplate.) 22
Thus, we sound a note of caution to those tempted to overread what
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy may have said in their previous dissents.
Both may write differently, as fifth votes for the Court, than they do when
they write for themselves in dissent. Dissenters, of course, having lost the
case at hand, may be tempted to let fly loose language ranging far beyond
the facts before them, language that would, on more sober reflection, ill-suit
a majority opinion of the Court. We do not deny that Justice O'Connor's
Metro Broadcasting dissent does include strong language that, read in isola-
tion, might seem to squint against Bakke. (So too, Justice Powell's opinion
in Bakke itself contains much strong language that-read in isolation-
might seem to squint against language later in his own Bakke opinion.)123
But, in retrospect, it now seems clear that opponents of Roe read too much
into Justice O'Connor's dissent in City of Akron v. Center for Reproductive
Health,24 only to be upset by Casey, and that proponents of school prayer
wrongly extrapolated from Justice Kennedy's partial dissent in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU 15 to be upset by Lee v. Weisman.12 1 Critics of
affirmative action in education should remember that much of the most
pointed anti-affirmative action language from these Justices has likewise
appeared in dissents.127
A close comparison of Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting
and her majority opinion in Adarand highlights this difference in tone.
Although her Metro Broadcasting dissent contains some sharp language, in
Adarand she went out of her way to reassure readers with words
122. See supra note 12.
123. See Karst & Horowitz, supra note 121, at 8, 11.
124. 462 U.S. 416, 452-75 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a similar (and in retro-
spect, prophetic) warning against the overreading of Akron Center, see Estrich & Sullivan, supra
note 46.
125. 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
126. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
127. Another clue about a given judge or Justice's leanings on Bakke may perhaps be teased
out of his or her own policies in hiring law clerks. Does a particular jurist-as a government
actor-consider applications in an absolutely strict race-blind way? Or, instead, does the judge
think about how a clerk with a particular racial identity and life experience might have some-
thing distinctive to teach the judge and fellow clerks?
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that-though not invoking Bakke by name-left the door open for a reaffir-
mance of Justice Powell's approach:
According to JUSTICE STEVENS, our view of consistency "equates
remedial preferences with invidious discrimination," and ignores the
difference between "an engine of oppression" and an effort "to foster
equality in society," or, more colorfully, "between a 'No Trespassing'
sign and a welcome mat." It does-nothing of the kind.... It says
nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that deter-
mination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny.128
If we seek an example of this brand of strict scrutiny, let us remember that
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke itself of course explicitly applied strict
scrutiny and yet endorsed Harvard-style affirmative action in education.
II. POLICY AND STRUCTURE
Until now, we have simply been asking whether Bakke's fate is preor-
dained by Justice O'Connor's opinions in Croson, Metro Broadcasting, and
Adarand. Our negative answer naturally prompts us to ask whether Bakke
makes good sense from a practical and structural perspective. Such an
inquiry is more important here than in other constitutional contexts
because the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment seem rather
open on the question of affirmative action. Textually, exactly what does
equal protection require against a backdrop of historic racial inequality?
Historically, does the race-consciousness of early bills to help the freed-
men-passed by the same Congresses that gave us the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments-permit similar race-conscious policies one hundred
years later to eliminate the vestiges of a racial caste system?'29 While text
128. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114 (quoting id. at 2120, 2121, 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting))
(citations omitted). For a similar suggestion, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion per O'Connor, J.).
129. Our diversity analysis does not focus on any particular race. Of course, the case for
affirmative action is strongest for blacks, where the historical arguments for affirmative action
(such as they exist) have the most force. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985). But because all sorts of people
contribute to diversity, drawing the line at African Americans will not achieve full diversity. For
an analysis of affirmative action for people of other races, see Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige,
Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855 (1995).
Because pluses in admissions are quite different from set-aside scholarships, we do not consi-
der the implications of our theory for minority targeted scholarships. For an examination of these
programs, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HIGHER EDUCATION-INFORMATION ON
MINORITY-TARGETED SCHOLARSHIPS (1994).
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and history may not tell the Court what to do, however, policy and more
general structural arguments might.
There are, after all, sound reasons why the Court should hesitate to
repudiate Bakke-even in the post.Adarand era. To see this more clearly,
let us return to two key ways in which Harvard-plan affirmative action
differs dramatically from the rigid contracting set-asides struck down by the
Supreme Court.
A. Quotas Versus Pluses
Our first point concerns quotas versus pluses, or to use Justice
O'Connor's phraseology, classifications versus considerations. Race-based
classifications impose wooden notions of what it means to be diverse; racial
considerations, by contrast, permit and indeed require evaluation of a
whole person. From a constitutional standpoint, the distinction between
classification and consideration draws upon two separate fairness ideas.
First, a classification is unfair to the Allan Bakkes of the world because it
automatically excludes them on the basis of their skin color. Because of his
pigmentation, Allan Bakke was not even allowed to compete for sixteen out
of one hundred seats at U.C. Davis. 30 Second, classifications are stigma-
tizing to minorities. Quotas create the impression that minority students are
admitted because of the seats wholly set aside for them and only them, and
they imply that race is altogether different from other diversity factors in
the "normal" and "pure" admissions process.
Using race as one consideration among many, however, minimizes
both problems. Minority applicants are not segregated into a separate
admissions compartment where their files sit with each other and compete
only against one another; 3' instead, they are treated just like other appli-
cants and the kinds of diversity they may offer are assessed alongside other
kinds of diversity (of musicians, Texans, chess players, French speakers, and
so on). Background and life experience are positive attributes-like growing
up Amish-and it is neither unfair to whites nor stigmatizing to minorities
130. See Laurence H. Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness or
Structural Justice?, 92 HARV. L. REV. 864, 867-70 (1979).
131. A strict quota system exacerbates the "Octoroon" and "Aleut" problems noted earlier,
supra notes 20 and 84, by in effect requiring an application form with a fixed number of racial
boxes. By contrast, a sensitive plus system need not pigeonhole persons into boxes; the admis-
sions committee can consider the entirety of a person's (perhaps complex) racial and social experi-
ence. For rich discussions of the complexity of "racial identity," see IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ,
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 145 (1994).
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to consider these factors so long as they do not become the only or the
dominant things that admissions committees look at.'32 If having a dis-
tinctive racial experience is viewed in the same way as being bilingual or a
good violinist, then the Allan Bakkes of the world may have an easier time
understanding the preference. (The bilingual analogy is, we submit, a
rather precise one; many-not all, but many-black Americans today must
in effect navigate "bilingually" through black America and white America.)
If a given minority student understands that she is valued not because of
what her ancestors went through two centuries ago, but rather because of
what she goes through every day, she may feel less stigma and more self-
esteem.
As a practical matter, admissions committees often inevitably know
something about the race of an applicant because their goal is to look at a
whole person. Just as it is permissible for legislatures to consider their
knowledge about racial demographics when they create voting districts
because they "always [are] aware of race"' 33 in drawing boundaries, it may
make sense to permit admissions committees to consider what they will
know anyway. To demand otherwise will force admissions committees to
evaluate an applicant without ever understanding who that applicant really
is. Colleges do not accept an SAT score and a GPA; they accept a whole
person.
B. Democratic Diversity in Education
The cornerstone of our argument remains democratic diversity. While
diversity analogies can be drawn between education and other spheres
(witness the FCC's attempt in Metro Broadcasting), we must not lose sight of
Justice Powell's vision of the unique democratic value of diversity in educa-
tion-a message sometimes missed by academics. 114 Kathleen Sullivan, for
example, has written that if race is "used as merely one factor in the bid-
ding process [for government contracts] without a preassigned weight," then
132. Thus, as Justice Powell said in Bakke, affirmative action must not "insulate the indivi-
dual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats." Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
133. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
134. And perhaps even by Justice Powell himself. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480
U.S. 616 (1987), the Court, in an opinion Powell joined, upheld the Santa Clara County Trans-
portation Agency's affirmative action plan because it "resembles the 'Harvard Plan' approvingly
noted by [Justice Powell] in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, which considers race along
with other criteria in determining admission to the college .... Similarly, the Agency Plan
requires women to compete with all other qualified applicants. No persons are automatically
excluded from consideration .... Id. at 638 (citation omitted).
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the "approach would be analogous to the Harvard College admissions plan
praised by Justice Powell." '135 But diversity takes on a special meaning in
the school. As Brown v. Board of Education put it, education is "the very
foundation of good citizenship" and "a principal instrument in awakening
the [student] to cultural values," preparing her for participation as a politi-
cal equal in a pluralist democracy.'36 Moreover, university education typ-
ically occurs at a distinctive time of life-young adulthood-when people
are particularly open to new ideas and when they have a tendency to bond
with others. (For similar reasons, this bonding may also occur in places like
the Army and the Peace Corps.) 137
In other words, much of the point of education is to teach students
how others think and to help them understand different points of view-to
teach students how to be sovereign, responsible, and informed citizens in a
heterogeneous democracy. A school admits students, in large part, so that
they will be teachers to other students. Again: SAT scores and grades are
at best a crude proxy for a student's potential to teach other students-
often, an applicant's background and life experience will also be vital com-
ponents of this potential. If a university wants to teach people about
France, the university should admit students from France; if a university
wants to teach people about the South, it should admit students from the
South. The university experience is thus quite different from the very
attenuated interaction between the minority "owner" of a broadcast station
and the public in Metro Broadcasting, and even more different from the
largely nonexistent contact between the minority and nonminority contrac-
135. Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against
Affirmative Action, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1609, 1615-16 n.39 (1990).
136. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting Ambach language linking "public education" to
America's "democratic political system" and adding that such education should promote "toler-
ance of divergent political and religious views"); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)
(opinion of the Court, per Powell, J.) (quoting Brown and then describing "public schools as an
'assimilative force' by which diverse and conflicting elements in our society are brought together on
a broad but common ground ... inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of
a.democratic political system" (quoting JOHN DEWEY,.DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 26 (1929))
(emphasis added)).
137. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces,
38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 500 (1991).
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tors in Croson and Adarand. Integrated education democratically benefits
students of all races, including white students, by providing a space for
people of all races to grow together. 3 '
Thus, Bakke builds squarely on the rock of Brown. Brown held that
education was sui generis and that even if racial segregation could be toler-
ated in other spheres, the school was different. Recall that, technically,
Brown did not explicitly overrule Plessy, but simply said that the separate-
but-equal rule had "no place" "in the field of public education."'39 Like-
wise, Bakke says that even if affirmative action is unconstitutional in other
spheres, schools are different and may be able to take race into account to
bring races together. Indeed, the entire structure of Justice Powell's opin-
ion proclaims that education is special. In Parts IV-A, IV-B, and IV-C of
his Bakke opinion, he crisply casts aside sweeping justifications for affirma-
tive action that would radiate far beyond education: proportionality for its
own sake, broad remediation of "societal discrimination," and facilitating
the delivery of services to consumers. But in Parts IV-D and V, he
embraces a diversity theory that paradigmatically applies to education.
138. As Duke President Nan Keohane recently remarked:
From where I sit, only one strategy for dealing with our increasingly diverse world
appears likely to be successful for the long term-a strategy that deliberately takes advan-
tage of the educational power of diversity. Such a strategy is not easy to design or imple-
ment, but the possible alternatives are ultimately sterile.
Return to the Good 01' Days?, 6 J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. 90 (1994-1995); see also Text of
Affirmative Action Review Report to President Clinton, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 139 (Special
Supplement) at D-30 (July 20, 1995) ("Virtually all educators acknowledge that a college is a
better academic enterprise if the student body and faculty are diverse."); Brest & Oshige, supra
note 129, at 863 ("We believe that encounters among students from different back-
grounds-especially within an academic institution that seeks to encourage intergroup relations
and discourse-tend to reduce prejudice and alienation."); cf. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford,
Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 920 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (opinion of Silberman, J.) ("Unlike the
state's goal in Bakke, which arguably served to break down racial and ethnic stereotypes, the
FCC's policy does not reinforce the 'melting pot' because television viewers never have any
knowledge of the race or ethnicity of the various station owners."), rev'd sub nom. Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
139. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. Of course, soon after Brown came down, the Court invoked it
to invalidate other vestiges of Jim Crow. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956)
(invoking Brown to invalidate bus segregation). Thus Brown quickly came to stand for more than
educational desegregation. But it still does stand for the specialness of education. See, e.g., Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222-23 (1982) ("What we said 28 years ago in Brown [about education's
special status] still holds true.").
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Of course, a contracting, set-aside may "diversify" an industry (as could
integrated workplaces in the pre-Brown era),' 4° but the democratic bene-
fits of diversity may not be as strong outside the educational setting. The diversity-in-
contracting argument assumes that mingling will somehow occur between
firms-a rather heroic or impossible assumption in many contractual set-
tings. In the school context, by contrast, people from different back-
grounds are thrown together for four years, and they are there to learn.
Inherent in the concept of diversity-based affirmative action is a recog-
nition of the positive educational value of race and life experience. This
differs dramatically from contracting cases involving guardrails and urinals,
where affirmative action has no such theory of value. In the contracting
arena, a minority is valuable only because the person's race helps secure a
contract. Whites may resent the fact that a minority, simply by virtue of
her skin color, wins a contract when a white firm could have completed the
job at a lower cost. Minorities, for their part, may internalize the belief
that they need a handout in order to compete with whites. In education,
by contrast, a minority can be intrinsically valuable if she brings a missing
element to the school. Because the minority student must still be evaluated
on other criteria besides diversity, the school can ensure that it is admitting
a student who has the academic prowess to keep up with the rest of the
student body-an important consideration because the goal is to encourage
intermingling and learning from each other.
Of course, any form of affirmative action for nonwhites risks backlash
from whites. But failure to do anything to integrate disadvantaged minori-
ties into mainstream America risks minority backlash-race riots tomorrow,
perhaps, and potential democratic breakdown in a generation or two.
Affirmative action in education contains the best long-run antidote to back-
lash and enmity among races, by bringing diverse elements of society into a
common space, a common conversation. (It is precisely in such spaces that
the "Creolization" and "loving" Jim Chen celebrates can begin to take
root.)' 4' What's more, diversity has a built-in stopping point, an inherent
140. The democratic value of integrated workplaces-bringing persons from different back-
grounds to work together as a team-highlights the importance of laws like Title VII.
141. See Chen, supra note 131.
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limit on the amount of permissible affirmative action: If a school admits
minority students who are not roughly equal to white students, it may
actually undermine the democratic benefits of diversity by reinforcing stere-
otypes of minority students as poor students. 14  A critical mass of stu-
dents of a particular group may be needed so that other students become
aware of the group (and of the diversity within the group),143 but this by
no means requires exact proportionality-or anything like it. 14
142. See Lino A. Graglia, Hopwood v. Texas: Racial Preferences in Higher Education Upheld
and Endorsed, 45 J. LEGAL EDUc. 79, 82-83, 92-93 (1995).
Although Justice Powell in Bakke did not specify the precise amount of permissible weight to
be given to race, he did make clear that race should not be a "decisive" "factor" that would
"insulate" a person of one race from comparison with others, and that race must be "simply one
element-to be weighed fairly against other elements." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 317-18 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added). At some point, when a
racial plus looms so much larger than other diversity factors, an admissions scheme would, it
seems, violate the letter and spirit of Bakke. In this regard, universities that are designing affirma-
tive action programs would do well to consider the following language from Justice O'Connor's
Metro Broadcasting dissent: "The Court's emphasis on the multifactor process should not be con-
fused with the claim that the preference is in some sense a minor one. It is not. The basic non-
race criteria are not difficult to meet .... [R]ace is clearly the dispositive factor in a substantial
percentage of comparative proceedings." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 630 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
143. On the huge importance of intra-racial diversity, see supra note 87.
144. Suppose, instead, that diversity is used to limit the representation of certain minori-
ties-"minuses" rather than "pluses" for Asians or Jews, for example. In many cases, this may
well be a smokescreen for prejudice against racial and ethnic outgroups, protection of whom is
central to the history underlying the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course, this anti-minority
program could derive little support from Bakke itself, in light of the Brennan Four's language on
this issue. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45. Here we see that in applying strict scrutiny
to all racial preferences, courts may nonetheless be obliged to distinguish between true affirmative
action and old-style racial discrimination.
This approach finds support in Adarand itself. In Justice Ginsburg's words:
Properly, a majority of the Court calls for review that is searching in order to ferret out
classifications in reality malign, but masquerading as benign. The Court's once lax
review of sex-based classifications demonstrates the need for such suspicion. Today's
decision thus usefully reiterates that the purpose of strict scrutiny "is precisely to dis-
tinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race in governmental decisionmaking," "to
'differentiate between' permissible and impermissible governmental use of race," to dis-
tinguish "'between a "No Trespassing" sign and a welcome mat."'
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2136 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting id. at 2112, 2113, 2114) (citations omitted).
Critics have portrayed diversity as a tool only to help whites under-
stand blacks-or as an exploitative way of adding spice to a white mix.1 45
We disagree. Minorities may benefit just as much from diversity as whites
do. An African American from rural Georgia, after all, can learn from a
white suburbanite from Phoenix, and the suburbanite can learn from the
Georgian. We do not mean to glamorize; we recognize that affirmative
action programs may not always work this way. If a diversity program does
not, in practice, allow all students to learn from each other, then the pro-
gram is not serving the state's interest in diversity-and the school should
not use the "diversity" slogan to show how the program passes constitu-
tional muster.
We would, for example, be troubled by de facto segregation in univer-
sity dorms. If schools believe that minorities add to diversity, then they
should not encourage different groups to cordon themselves off from each
other. Diversity is often tough-it is only natural that people from different
backgrounds may find it easier to stick with what is familiar. Doing so,
however, blunts the point of diversity-based admissions in the first place-it
inhibits the interactive learning process. All of this suggests that schools
that permit de facto residential segregation may be estopped from pleading
Bakke as a defense to affirmative action in admissions. Schools are not
required to adopt affirmative action policies-nor are they constitutionally
obliged to address self-segregated housing-but if they do choose to adopt
diversity programs, then they should live up to the goal of encouraging
people to learn from each other.
Of course, diversity cannot function the same way, or be as important,
in every academic context. There may be settings where diversity may not
have much educational importance at all (graduate school in math, per-
haps) and other settings where it will matter a great deal (college, for exam-
ple). And there is a wide range of places in the middle. But we must be
careful not to underestimate the importance of diversity-even in educa-
tional settings that, at first blush, seem to have little to gain through diver-
sity. As Justice Powell himself noted while justifying affirmative action for
the Davis Medical School:
145. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 570 n.46 (1984):
In law school admissions, for example, majority persons may be admitted as a matter of
right, while minorities are admitted because their presence will contribute to "diver-
sity." ... The assumption is that such diversity is educationally valuable to the majority.
But such an admissions program may well be perceived as treating the minority admittee
as an ornament, a curiosity, one who brings an element of the piquant to the lives of
white professors and students.
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It may be argued that there is greater force to these views at the
undergraduate level than in a medical school where the. training is
centered primarily on professional competency. But even at the
graduate level, our tradition and experience lend support to the view
that the contribution of diversity is substantial.'
Our democratic diversity point can perhaps also be recast into remedial
language. The Court in Adarand and other anti-affirmative action cases has
acknowledged that race can indeed be used in narrowly tailored remedies
for discrete constitutional violations. 147 Diversity in education may not
be narrowly tailored, nor does it respond to discrete violations; but the
integration of our universities, great and small, may well be, in Ken Karst's
nice phrase, "the best long-term remedy for the private beliefs and behavior
that perpetuate the effects of racial caste."'48
CONCLUSION
Our trek through the contracting cases suggests that educational affir-
mative action on a Harvard-plan model may pass Supreme Court muster.
There are sound reasons why this is so-reasons that we believe are at the
heart of Bakke and at the core of much of Justice O'Connor's writings on
race. There is a proud American tradition of treating education differently
from other spheres: Education is different-special-because it teaches
Americans how to become full citizens in a heterogeneous, pluralistic
scheme of democratic self-government. As Justice Powell wrote in Bakke,
"the 'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure'
to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peo-
ples."'1 49  Adarand-like set-asides set us apart, but Bakke-like affirmative
action brings Americans together."5° Under a Constitution that begins
146. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (opinion of Powell, J.).
147. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117; United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 92, 167 (1987) (plural-
ity opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148. Kenneth L. Karst, Private Discrimination and Responsibility: Patterson in Context, 1989
SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 36. Note also how a social-remedy theory-though not, by itself, sufficient to
justify affirmative action-can be added to a diversity theory both to explain the social difference
between "welcome mats" and "No Trespassing signs" and to suggest a temporal endgame and exit
strategy for affirmative action in education. See supra text accompanying note 46.
149. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
150. Thus the key constitutional evil is not so much race-consciousness, as some seem to
believe, but racial divisiveness, enmity, polarization, or subordination. For a somewhat similar
suggestion, see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and the Powers of Government, 41 UCLA
L. REV. 1297, 1316-21 (1994).
Bakke's Fate 1779
with a vision of We the People coming together in order to form a more
perfect union (e pluribus unum-out of many, one), this coming together of
Americans to teach and to learn from each other is an inspiring event to
behold. 15
151. For a similar vision underlying the American jury, see Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing
Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1182-99 (1991); Akhil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing
Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283, 1287-89 (1984).
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